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Protectionist Pitfalls in U.S. Tax Reform
By James R. Hines Jr.
The magnitude of current and projected U.S. budget deficits
makes it appropriate for the government to cast its net wide in
seeking new revenue sources. In doing so, however, there is the
danger of misconstruing the role of domestic taxation in a global
economy, and thereby designing a tax reform proposal with
significant protectionist elements.
Movements to impose heavier taxes on Americans earning
active income abroad would undermine the vitality of the U.S.
economy and its ability to generate tax revenue. A much sounder
and more sustainable tax reform course would be to increase the
country’s reliance on expenditure-based taxes, which is the
direction most of the world has taken in response to the
competitive pressures faced by all economies.
Active foreign income earned by American businesses is taxed
by foreign governments and, to a lesser extent, by the U.S.
government. U.S. taxes typically apply to that income only when
it is returned to the United States and after taxpayers have been
allowed to claim credits for foreign tax payments. The resulting
low ratio of U.S. tax collections to annual foreign income gives
the system the appearance of treating foreign income more
generously than domestic income and thus makes it an attractive
target of reform efforts designed to raise tax revenue.
In fact, the United States taxes foreign income far more heavily
than any other major capital-exporting country. Efforts to in-
crease the U.S. tax burden by limiting deferral or reducing
foreign tax credits would only increase the obstacles facing
American firms attempting to compete in global markets and
thrive at home.
James R. Hines Jr. is the Richard A. Musgrave Collegiate Professor
of Economics in the economics department at the University of
Michigan and a professor of law in the law school. He also serves as
a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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The question for reformers is whether current U.S. taxation of
foreign income is excessive, or alternatively whether the absence
of full U.S. taxation of foreign profits is tantamount to an
unwarranted subsidy. The burdens are easily identified: Ameri-
can firms are at a significant disadvantage in low-tax foreign
markets compared with all of their foreign counterparts. Com-
petition with investors from countries that exempt foreign in-
come from taxation raises acquisition prices and other costs of
operating abroad, thereby effectively pricing Americans out of
foreign markets despite the benefits of low tax rates.
Far from being unconscionable loopholes, the limited ability to
claim credits for foreign taxes and the deferral of active foreign
income do not permit American businesses to compete effec-
tively against investors from any other country in the world. As
a result, American firms lose the productivity benefits that would
otherwise contribute to their worldwide profitability.
Efforts to increase the U.S. tax burden on foreign income are
motivated by the understandable concern that foreign invest-
ment by American firms comes at the expense of domestic
investment and employment. While there are examples of Ameri-
can employers substituting foreign production for domestic
production, there are also hundreds of American companies
whose domestic profitability depends in part on their foreign
operations. The net effect of foreign investment on domestic
economic activity by American firms therefore depends on the
relative magnitudes of the substitution and productivity consid-
erations — and the evidence suggests that the productivity
effects dominate.
American firms expanding foreign operations generally ex-
pand domestic operations at the same time. The most recent
statistical evidence indicates that a 10 percent growth in a firm’s
foreign employment is accompanied by a 3.7 percent growth in
domestic employment. Recent evidence for British, Canadian,
German, and other firms displays similar patterns.
The more general point is that the desirability of greater
domestic economic activity does not imply that greater foreign
activity is undesirable. On the contrary, every nation can benefit
— and the United States certainly does benefit — from expanded
international trade and investment. When Americans invest
abroad, they not only undertake greater domestic investment
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themselves, but also encourage foreign investment in the United
States. As a result of international exchange, business assets are
held by the most productive owners, regardless of nationality, to
the benefit of all economies.
It does not follow from this logic that the U.S. tax system
should subsidize foreign investment; rather, the United States
should follow the policies of virtually every other nation in
exempting active foreign income from taxation. Doing so pro-
motes efficient ownership of business assets and generates more
total tax revenue than a policy that discourages cross-border
ownership. The alternative viewpoint — that a failure to tax
active foreign income is equivalent to a subsidy — is itself little
more than a protectionist fallacy. The reality is that foreign
governments tax that income, and competition from foreigners
whose home governments exempt foreign income from taxation
removes the need for the United States to tax the income directly.
Expenditure taxes such as excise taxes and VATs are attractive
alternatives to corporate and personal income taxes in a globally
competitive world. Expenditures have clear geographic associa-
tions, reducing the potential for international tax avoidance and
greatly reducing the mobility of the tax base compared with
income tax options. There is ample opportunity to deepen our
reliance on expenditure taxes.
The United States is one of the few countries with no VAT, and
the U.S. ratio of excise tax collections to total tax revenue is the
lowest in the OECD. Historically, small countries with the most
open economies have relied most on expenditure taxes, because
the personal income tax — and in particular the business income
tax — alternatives have been much more costly. But economic
developments are rapidly turning all countries, including the
United States, into small countries.
Fair and efficient tax policies do not tax all income that
governments can identify. Instead they are selective, reflecting
the potential mobility of the tax base and the circumstances in
which income is earned. Americans earn foreign income in
environments that are made highly competitive by the actions of
investors that are not taxed by their home countries. In seeking
new revenue sources, it would be a serious mistake to increase
U.S. taxation of active foreign income, particularly compared
with expenditure tax alternatives.
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